中美涉台问题的战略怀疑与威慑不平衡 Strategic Suspicion and Imbalanced Deterrence in the Taiwan-related Issues between China and the United States

Abstract

中美之间在台海区域内相互威慑，但这种威慑为什么不能达到稳定与平衡的状态？本文认为，中美之间的战略怀疑，使得双方威慑不稳定，军备竞赛螺旋式上升，影响台海安全。透过中美过去涉及台湾问题的几个事件，本文发现，中美之间因为过去的欺骗认定或是误解，造成了如今的战略怀疑。美中基于对“保卫台湾”与“一个中国”原则的怀疑，使得双方相互威慑不断升级。由此引起的战略怀疑，不仅仅是由过去的欺骗引起，也会由过去的误解引起，本文补充了有关信号与欺骗的战略认知研究框架。

There exists mutual deterrence between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait region. However, why has this deterrence failed to achieve stability and balance? This paper argues that strategic suspicion between China and the United States has resulted in an unstable deterrence, a spiralling arms race, and a significant impact on the security of the Taiwan Strait. By examining several past events involving Taiwan-related issues between China and the United States, this paper argues that strategic suspicion today is a consequence of past deceptions or misunderstandings. The mutual suspicion between China and the United States are based on their mutual doubts regarding the principles of “defending Taiwan” and the “One China” policy which in turn has escalated the cycle of mutual deterrence. This study contributes to the existing research framework on strategic cognition by addressing the strategic significance of signals and deception.